Many have sought to divide the self into separate parts. From Aristotle's distinction between the rational and irrational self, to Freud's separation of the conscious from the unconscious mind, from Kahnemann's fast and slow self, to McGilchrist's selves of the left and right brain. But critics argue it makes no sense to see the self as divided. From Descartes to Sartre, many philosophers have concluded that to be conscious is to be consious of something and there can be no further self hiding within consciousness.  After all, if there are two aspects of the self does it not require a third to oversee or combine them?  Meanwhile neuroscience has been unable to identify a self at all let alone multiple selves.  

Should we give up the idea of distinct selves as simply incoherent?  Should we conclude that a single self is necessary both to account for conscious experience and to enable responsibility for action?  Or are multiple selves necessary both to account for different aspects of us, and for wildly divergent thoughts and behaviour that we can exhibit.  

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