Most assume the great scientific advances were inevitable — that overwhelming evidence simply forced the world to change its mind. Yet critics argue that the triumphs of even our most familiar scientific theories owe as much to social context as to evidence and reason. Philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend argued the Big Bang dominates not due to data alone, but because post-war astronomy favoured origin stories and the theory's champions gained institutional clout. Others suggest Darwin's theory of evolution took hold partly because Victorian culture was already steeped in notions of competition and progress. Some go further, arguing that even the identification of water as H₂O is not definitive but the product of a particular cultural and historical context.
Should we conclude that cultural context plays a role in framing our scientific theories? Instead of looking to one theory as the truth, would we be better to maintain a plurality and pursue each for its explanatory and predictive power? Or does this risk wasting time and energy on failed ideas, while taking resources from those with greater potential?
Should we conclude that cultural context plays a role in framing our scientific theories? Instead of looking to one theory as the truth, would we be better to maintain a plurality and pursue each for its explanatory and predictive power? Or does this risk wasting time and energy on failed ideas, while taking resources from those with greater potential?
