Although many no longer think science capable of providing a final account of reality, we still picture our theories, from Newton to Einstein to quantum mechanics, as becoming steadily more correct. But critics argue this is a mistake, because we cannot make sense of getting closer to the truth if we do not know what a final theory looks like. Ptolemy, for example, refined the Aristotelian account of the heavens in which stars were carried on giant celestial spheres, but we do not see him as getting closer to the truth — since we see the whole framework as nonsense. And Thomas Kuhn, the influential philosopher of science, argued the same is true of our current theories, which operate within an overall paradigm which might be entirely overthrown in the future.
Should we see science as refining current paradigms, and abandon the idea that science is getting closer to the truth? Were the pragmatists right to see the truth of science as a function of its usefulness? Or do we need truth in order to refine our theories even if they can't arrive at a final account?
Should we see science as refining current paradigms, and abandon the idea that science is getting closer to the truth? Were the pragmatists right to see the truth of science as a function of its usefulness? Or do we need truth in order to refine our theories even if they can't arrive at a final account?
